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Defined as the function of the
court to interpret and apply the
constitution to particular circumstances
and legal issues, judicial review has
become a noteworthy expression of the
power of the judiciary. Nearly 200 years
old, this seemingly simple doctrine has
instigated a substantial amount of
political controversy and debate from
which three individuals should be
recognized for their contributions.
Ronald Dworkin, a proponent of judicial
activism, believes in “leaving issues to
the court’s judgment” and investing our
faith in their decisions (Dworkin 526).
Supporting Dworkin, John Arthur asserts
that judicial review promotes
democracy, and more importantly,
imposes safeguards against unauthorized
decisions made by the legislative branch.
Staunch opposition to support for
judicial review is apparent in arguments
from Jeremy Waldron. Affirming that
external authority is unreliable and
consistently fluctuating, Waldron alleges
that judicial review is just a social
construction … a façade used by the
masses to fool themselves into believing
that culture is legally self-binding.
Careful review of the strengths and
weaknesses of judicial review, however,
prove that a legal system possessing
such a function allows one to feel more
secure and safe. Albeit judicial review
may be a charade, it comforts the
common man in the confusing land of
legal studies.
Defending judicial activism,
Dworkin maintains that the constitution
of the United States leaves controversial
issues to the judgment of the court.
“Designed to protect individual citizens
and groups against certain decisions that
a majority of citizens might want to
make,” the court functions as an
authoritarian, interpreting the language
of the constitution in legal issues
(Dworkin 526).  Noting the “vague
standards” chosen by the founders of the
Constitution, Dworkin bases the
Supreme Court’s judicial review and
decision-making in “the concept of
fairness, [rather] than specific
conceptions of fairness” (Dworkin 527).
Essentially, Dworkin links the authority
of the court to their opportunity to
construct social policy while interpreting
the Constitution. While maintaining
fidelity to the historic text and
recognizing outdated conceptions, the
judiciary has the power to change what
the Constitution enacted, forging an
innovative conception of an established
law.
In comparing and contrasting
judicial activism and restraint, Dworkin
communicates the importance of
consistent functionality and activity on
the behalf of the courts. While
“accepting the directions of the so-called
vague constitutional provisions, … [the
courts] should work out principles of
legality, equality, and … revise these
principles from time to time” (Dworkin
529). This activist prerogative results in
a system where the courts actually
analyze the acts committed by Congress,
the states, and the President. Conversely,
the agenda of the judicial restraint
program, which Dworkin thoroughly
refutes, is contingent upon the courts
submission to the rule of other branches
of government. This policy consists of
two theories that attempt to substantiate
such behavior: political skepticism and
judicial deference. The former attacks
the activist standpoint in asserting that
individuals lack moral rights against the
state that governs them. This skeptical
viewpoint claims that individuals “have
only … legal rights as the Constitution
grants them, and these are limited to
plain and uncontroversial violations of
public morality that the framers must
have had actually in mind” (Dworkin
530). Dworkin, however, tackles the
skeptic attitude by stressing the fact that
according to the theory of moral rights,
men must have moral rights against
those who have the power to abuse them
or treat them in a negative manner
(Dworkin 530).
Another theory of judicial
restraint focuses on deference to other
authorities in constitutional and legal
matters. Based in the philosophies of
Richard Nixon, judicial deference admits
that individuals do have moral rights
other than what is specifically defined in
the Constitution, but political institutions
other than courts wield the power to
establish these rights. Simply enough,
this form of judicial restraint
relinquishes the power of courts in
establishing the law. Instead,
“controversial issues of political
morality … [are left] to other
departments of the government”
(Dworkin 531). Those in favor of
deference rely upon an argument from
democracy, which ascertains that
responsible, elected state legislators,
rather than appointed, politically
irresponsible judges, reserve the right to
establish law. At first glance, this theory
may appear very fair and the decisions
made by legislators might seem sound
and complete. The lack of fairness,
however, is indicated in the definition of
Constitutionalism, “the theory that the
majority must be restrained to protect
individual rights” (Dworkin 532). In this
case, fairness is apparent in a judicial
activist model rather than in accordance
with democratic theory.  Nevertheless,
legislators tend to create what is
desirable rather than what will actually
benefit the population.  Dworkin,
conversely, supports the judicial activists
whom simply create social policy.
Although such a point of view may not
necessarily
consider the future, it successfully
interprets and applies the interests the
founders expressed in the constitution,
and ultimately “frames and answers
questions of political morality”
(Dworkin 534). This activist view
passionately supports the use of judicial
review in ascertaining the
constitutionality of a particular situation.
Supplementing Dworkin’s
activist support of judicial review,
Arthur’s conception of “self-
incapacitation” establishes a reliable
form of self-government, which
combines with judicial review, fostering
the preservation of a healthy democracy
(Arthur 545). Laying a foreground upon
which a comprehensive definition of
democracy can be created, Arthur’s
primary focus concerns the fairness and
openness of participation that will allow
all individuals to participate in unbiased,
democratic government. Under unbiased
guidelines, the courts enable the
common man to express his point of
view and express disapproval of public
officials (Arthur 547). Such is evident in
the eliminating “unfair districting
patterns at both the state and local
government levels,” and “abolish[ing]
laws imposing literacy requirements on
voters and college students, and rejected
residency requirements for members of
the military who wishes to vote” (Arthur
547).
Focusing on curbing the
temptation of man to do things he will
probably regret, self-incapacitating rules
substantiate Arthur’s argument. Because
“elected officials, under pressure …
sometimes act in haste … decisions may
reflect prejudice towards [minorities]
that, on further reflection would know to
be wrong” (Arthur 548). In such a
situation, by incapacitating oneself, there
is a guarantee that constitutional rights
of individuals will be upheld. Curiously,
however, against the prerogatives of
elected officials and the masses, the
Supreme Court may make a decision that
fiercely opposes the desires of the
majority. Examples include Supreme
Court approvals of abortion and prayer
in school, both of which instigate
questions concerning how “the mythical
political self … made unpopular self-
incapacitating decisions” (Arthur 549).
Further justification of the
decisions made by the Supreme Court
can be attributed to the special
competency possessed by judges. “Not
only are judges better situated legally to
make [decisions concerning
constitutional issues], they are also
politically better suited for it” (Arthur
550). Concerning the constitution, in a
legal sense the justices occupy a position
of authority over legislators. Such can be
attributed to the rule of law. Because
Congress represents one of the two
parties involved in making the law, they
are unable to preside over cases of
constitutionality.  “To allow either party,
[Congress or the masses,] to decide the
case … seems contrary to basic
principles of the rule of law” (Arthur
550).  Politically, the federal judges are
also better situated in making the law.
Because federal judges are given life
tenure when they are appointed, they are
relieved of a constituency of whom they
must gain approval. This “insulates
[justices] from electoral politics and the
need for reelection” (Arthur 550).
Additionally, with decisions made by
justices, there is often an emphasis on
precedent, consistency, and most
importantly, moral judgment. Simply,
“judges rule in such a way to protect the
moral and political legitimacy of
government”(Arthur 551). The
competency, reliability, consistency, and
honesty associated with the Supreme
Court substantiate and qualify judicial
review as a political process contingent
upon preserving the rights of individuals
and safeguarding against the masses
corrupt majoritarian politics.
Although slightly similar to the
theories of Arthur in some respects,
Waldron’s analysis of judicial review
results in a denial of the aforementioned
compatibility with democracy.
“Beginning with a distinction between
popular sovereignty (a constitution
chosen by the people) and democracy (a
government that is itself democratic),
Waldron discusses the [lack of]
legitimacy of judicial review” (Waldron
535). Primary distinctions between
popular sovereignty and democracy
established that popular support does not
imply democratic overtones, and
conversely, democratic voting of an
issue does not necessarily mean an issue
is democratic in nature.  For example, a
democratically elected dictatorship is not
democratic in nature.  Specific to the
constitution, although events over the
course of a period may occur
democratically, the nature of the change
may or may not necessarily be
democratic.
Precommitment, a theory very
similar in nature to Arthur’s self-
incapacitation, focuses on self-restraint.
Waldron’s precommitment is simply a
system of “constitutional constraints and
mechanisms of judicial review and other
mechanisms that responsible rights
bearers [take] against their own
imperfections” (Waldron 538).  Utilizing
the example of Ulysses’ crew tying him
to the mast of a ship, individuals
similarly put themselves at the hands of
the judiciaries. Waldron says that
because individuals are not always
capable of indifference concerning
legislature that affects them, individuals
possess the moral capacity to devise a
system by which precautions against
temptation can be organized.  “The
people agree to a safeguard that prevents
them, in the future exercise of their equal
political rights, from later changing their
minds and deviating from … a just
constitution” (Waldron 538).
Waldron feels, however, that the
system possesses a number of flaws,
such as the premeditation involved in
“deciding to decide” (Waldron 539).  A
common solution to such a problem
would typically involve the delegation of
power to an external structure. But even
then, Waldron argues, individuals will
still not be bound to certain actions,
because “they can always undo their ties
should they want to” (Waldron 539).
Instead, external power prominent
within the framework of constitutional
provisions inadvertently restrains the
agencies that represent the people.  At
least in this sense constitutional
legislation seems a little more promising.
Nevertheless, Waldron renounces
the efficacy of casual mechanisms in
guaranteeing constitutional practices and
legislation. Waldron’s mention of Jon
Elster’s theory involving casual
processes in external environments only
serves to provide a basis for debasing
precommitment. The example of the
drinking man relinquishing possession of
his car keys serves perfectly, such that
the precommitment of the drinker
operates solely on the discretion of the
friend possessing his keys. In this sense,
the mechanism is not entirely under the
drinker’s control. Waldron poses the
possibility of a child in need of
emergency medical treatment while in
the midst of a drunken parent. Should
the friend give the keys to a drunk
driver, or prevent the possibility of
further catastrophe?
Such confusion and inflexibility
paves the way for noncausal
mechanisms that uphold a true
conception of external authority. The
aforementioned example of the drinker
exemplifies that “constitutional
constraints do not operate mechanically,
but work instead by vesting a power of
decision … whose job it is to determine
as a matter of judgment” the nature of
the situation (Waldron 540). Less rigid
in nature, this form
calls upon the competency of a body of
individuals in ascertaining the
constitutionality of a specific situation.
Simply, “the arrangement amounts to a
deliberate decision by various agents …
to have themselves constrained by
others’ judgment” (Waldron 541).
Even then, however, Waldron
still claims the system is faulty.
Primarily, opinions and viewpoints
change over the course of time.
Eventually, “it becomes unclear or
controversial what the people have
committed themselves to” (Waldron
542).  This inconsistency renders
reliance on precommitment obsolete.
Additionally, Waldron proposes that the
judiciary cannot prevent individuals
from “judging their own case”  (Waldron
542). In the Ulysses example,
individuals can only settle disputes by
asking Ulysses. Similarly, the judiciary
can only clarify the nature of
precommitment by asking the people.  In
this sense, the people become the
authority of their own circumstance,
which staunchly opposes the designated
roles specified in the rule of law.
Moreover, Waldron ascertains that in
upholding precommitment, majorities
may disagree in deciding the solution to
a particular problem.  “It is particularly
problematic when such disagreements
can be expected to persist and to develop
and change in unpredictable ways”
(Waldron 543). As a result of these
complications, the judiciary is no more
qualified to uphold the precommitment
of the people any more than the
individuals are themselves.  Simply,
judicial review becomes a façade by
which the common man tries to convince
himself that issues are under scrutiny by
the government that rules them. “In
these circumstances, the logic of
precommitment must simply be put
aside, and we must leave the members of
the society to work out their differences
and to change their minds in collective
decision making over time” (Waldron
544).
Although Jeremy Waldron’s
logic provides substantial reasons to
question precommitment and judicial
review, certain charades and processes,
regardless of their flaws, are necessary
in maintaining order amongst the
masses. Ronald Dworkin and John
Arthur may not present the most sound
arguments, but review of the
constitutionality of legislation by a
seemingly external body does seem
more efficient and preferable to millions
of opinionated Americans trying to get a
piece of the political pie. Realizing that
no solution is ever perfect, judicial
review promotes the most consistent
form of balance among the populous.
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